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Unpunished Insults—The Looming 
Cyber Barbary Wars 
Col. Matteo G. Martemucci, USAF1 
This article argues that while current cyber literature 
focuses on cyber crime and cyber war, policy makers do not 
treat the most damaging cyber activity—large-scale economic 
espionage—in a manner commensurate with its importance. 
The threat from nation-states like China is real, and it requires 
a coherent strategy of response. The article analyzes the historic 
role of the U.S. government and the military in the protection of 
commerce from piracy and privateering at the turn of the last 
century. This provides useful context for the necessary debate 
over the role of the government and military in the defense of 
the modern cyberspace-enabled economy. This article further 
argues that there is a role for the US Government, and possibly 
the Department of Defense, in safeguarding US commerce in 
cyberspace just as it does in the physical domain. Policy leaders 
need to thoughtfully debate and define this role. 
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Weakness provokes insult and injury, while a condition to 
punish it often prevents it . . . I think it is in our interest to 
punish the first insult: because an insult unpunished is the 
parent of many others.2 
If we wish our commerce to be free and uninsulted, we must let 
these nations see that we have an energy which at present they 
disbelieve.3 
—Thomas Jefferson 
I. Introduction 
The current debate over threats, vulnerabilities, and 
responsibilities in cyberspace is incomplete. While the current cyber 
literature and academic debate focuses on cybercrime and cyberwar, 
policy makers do not treat the most damaging cyber activity—large-
scale economic espionage—in a manner commensurate with its 
importance. The greatest single threat to the American national 
existence we enjoy today is the systematic, long-term economic 
espionage by nation-states, like China, that contribute to the shifting 
of the balance of economic power away from the U.S. This threat is 
real, it is happening now, and it is growing fast. Economic espionage 
requires a coherent strategy of response. 
The U.S. military has historically served to maintain the security 
of the global commons to allow for the continuation and expansion of 
trade to the nation’s benefit. Along with the other instruments of 
national power, military capability serves as a powerful deterrent for 
illegal action by other states. In cyberspace, however, there is 
currently no equivalent motivation for states to act appropriately, 
resulting in significant negative impact on the U.S. economy. Thus, in 
addition to preventing cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, there is 
a role for the U.S. Government, and possibly for the Department of 
Defense (DoD), in safeguarding U.S. commerce on the high seas of 
cyberspace, just as it does in physical domains of the global commons. 
Unfortunately, policy leaders have yet to thoughtfully debate and 
define this role, but their participation is vital in addressing the 
serious threat of economic espionage. 
In recent years, cyber-based threats of all kinds have grabbed the 
consciousness of the public, pundits, and political leaders. Cyber 
attacks on Estonia in 2007 and on Georgia in 2008 form the outline of 
 
2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (Aug. 23, 1785), http:// 
avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/let32.asp. 
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Page (Aug. 20, 1785), http:// 
founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-08-02-0325. 
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many discussions about cyber war.4 The Stuxnet virus that destroyed 
nearly one thousand uranium-enriching centrifuges in Iran in 2010 by 
an as-yet unconfirmed entity has further shaded the picture.5 Recent 
large-scale theft of credit card and personal information from Target, 
JPMorgan, and others add color to the public consciousness.6 Yet, 
despite the details, the threat picture remains unclear. Many are 
afraid, but no one is exactly sure what to fear. The author’s research 
suggests that, in the realm of cyberspace, we are worrying about the 
wrong things. Current cyber literature and academic debate focus on 
cybercrime, politically motivated hacking, and cyber war, but they 
largely ignore the most important cyber threat today: large-scale 
economic espionage conducted by nation-states and their proxies. 
In May 2014, in the most significant case of direct attribution 
against a nation-state to date, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) 
issued an indictment against five Chinese hackers, explicitly linking 
them to a unit of the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army.7 “This is a 
case alleging economic espionage by members of the Chinese military 
and represents the first ever charges against a state actor for this type 
of hacking,” U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder said. “The range of 
trade secrets and other sensitive business information stolen in this 
case is significant and demands an aggressive response.”8 This 
indictment is a good first step, but it falls short of a credible response 
that may actually change China’s behavior because the DOJ’s 
indictment is not a credible deterrent. With no possibility of 
extradition, and no further cost imposed on the Chinese economy by 
the U.S. Government in response, the indictment alone prevents 
nothing, though it sits as an interesting piece of political theater. 
 
 
4. See, e.g., Marching off to Cyberwar, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 2008, 
http://www.economist.com/node/12673385.  
5. Mark Clayton, Stuxnet Attack on Iran Nuclear Program Came About a 
Year Ago, Report Says, CHR. SCI. MONITOR (January 3, 2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0103/Stuxnet-attack-on-Iran-
nuclear-program-came-about-a-year-ago-report-says.  
6. Ryan Tracy, In a Cyber Breach, Who Pays, Banks or Retailers?, WALL 
ST. J. (January 12, 2014, 7:25 PM), http://online.wsj.com/ news/ 
articles/SB10001424052702303819704579316861842957106.  
7. Press Release, U.S. Just. Dep’t, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military 
Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor 
Organization for Commercial Advantage (May 19, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-
cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor.  
8. Id.. 
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II. Historical Precedent: Threats to Commerce in 
1801—A New Nation’s Answer 
One can never draw perfect historical parallels, nor wisely stretch 
an analogy beyond its logical limits. However, the history of American 
military involvement in matters of economics and commerce, 
particularly in the global commons of the sea, bears review for its 
potential parallels to the cyberspace domain of today. In 1801, 
Thomas Jefferson deployed a small fleet of newly minted American 
warships to the Barbary Coast to stem the tide of piracy and 
extortion that was crippling the new nation’s trade-based economy.9 
The fifteen-year Barbary campaign, which combined diplomacy and 
military action, ended the centuries-old practice of paying tribute—
what would be considered bribes today—to marauding states for the 
safe passage of commercial ships by America and Europe’s trading 
countries. In what historian Joseph Wheelan described as “Principled 
American outrage,” the new nation demonstrated its refusal to accept 
the status quo and, in turn, set itself on a path of leadership in the 
defense of global commerce.10 Today, American intellectual property 
is a similarly lucrative prize for those seeking economic advantage. 
The intellectual capital, comprised of industry secrets, proprietary 
research, development, and business innovation,that resides in and 
transits through cyberspace is like the treasure of heavily laden and 
undefended merchant ships in pirate-infested waters.  
Cyberspace, as a man-made domain, is another ocean on which 
individuals, corporations, and nation-states create commerce and 
conduct global trade. In the physical domains of land, sea, air, and 
space, states have long-established responsibilities to protect their 
sovereign interests. The U.S. military has historically served to 
maintain the security of the Global Commons to allow for the 
continuation and expansion of trade to the nation’s benefit.11 Along 
with the other instruments of national power, military capability 
serves as a powerful deterrent for illegal action by other states. In 
cyberspace, however, there is no equivalent disincentive for nation-
states not to cheat. 
In the first century of the United States’ existence, its military 
was limited primarily to the protection of its economic interests.12 In 
 
9. See JOSEPH WHEELAN, JEFFERSON’S WAR: AMERICA’S FIRST WAR ON 
TERROR 1801-1805 105–107 (2003).  
10. Id. at xxi. 
11. Barry R. Posen, Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation 
of U.S. Hegemony, 28 INT’L SEC. 5, 8-9 (2003).  
12. See generally, Michael A. Palmer, The Navy: The Continental Period, 
1775-1890, NAVAL HIST. & HERIT. COMMAND, http:// www. history. 
navy.mil/history/history2.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2014) (explaining 
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fact, the new nation overcame its aversion to a powerful standing 
military only when the need arose to protect the commerce that 
supported a growing economy. Even then, it took years of economic 
losses to spur the government to military action.13 
The de facto dissolution of the American Continental Navy 
occurred when Congress sold off the last of its warships in 1785. 
Ironically, this occurred less than two years after Algiers seized six 
American merchant ships, and one year after the New York merchant 
ship Empress of China arrived in Canton to open trade with China.14 
It is significant that the establishment of the U.S. Navy was largely in 
response to foreign affronts to the fledgling nation’s commerce abroad. 
Protecting U.S. commerce from piracy and state-sponsored 
privateering along the Barbary Coast was a key factor in the 
commissioning of the U.S. Navy’s first warships in 1794.15 Over the 
ensuing two centuries, the predominant purpose of U.S. military 
engagements abroad, particularly those of the U.S. Navy and Marine 
Corps, were to protect American lives and property, usually by 
protecting commerce on the high seas. 
While the Caribbean proved fertile ground for piracy and 
privateering, the rampant extortion of commerce by pirates in the 
Mediterranean, operated by the independent Barbary States of 
Morocco, Tripoli, Algiers, and Tunis, was what first spurred the new 
United States to action. This brazen exploitation of European powers 
infuriated President Thomas Jefferson. He was incensed not only at 
the brutality of the Barbary tactics, but also at the European states’ 
unwillingness to respond.16 At the time of Jefferson’s election in 1801, 
America had also been complicit. It had paid an amount equivalent to 
one-fifth its entire annual income in tribute to the Pasha of Tripoli 
and the other states on the North African coast.17 After witnessing 
 
that “[t]he major post-War of 1812 mission of the U.S. Navy remained 
commerce protection.”).  
13. Robert F. Turner, President Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates, 
in 35 PIRACY AND MARITIME CRIME: HISTORICAL AND MODERN CASE 
STUDIES 157, 158–163 (Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes & David 
Rosenberg, eds., 2010).  
14. James Bradford, Defending U.S. Maritime Commerce in Peacetime 
from 1794 to Today, in AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY: A RESOURCE FOR 
TEACHERS AND STUDENTS 211, 211 (Paul Herber & Michael G. Noonan 
eds., 2013), http://www.fpri.org/docs/ American_Military_History 
_A_Resource.pdf. 
15. Id. 
16. See Turner, supra note 12, at 157, 159. 
17. For a review of U.S. Treasury estimates of the cost of the Peace with 
Algiers as a portion of the federal budget, see JOSHUA E. LONDON, 
VICTORY IN TRIPOLI 43 (2005) 
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this awkward game of extortion and complicity for years, first as 
minister to France and then as Washington’s Secretary of State, 
Jefferson had had enough. Both economic necessity and national 
honor caused Jefferson to eschew his aversion to a national military, 
and in 1801, he sent the majority of the U.S. Navy’s combat power—
comprised of four ships led by the USS Constitution—to the 
Mediterranean. By ordering the small fleet to Tripoli, Jefferson began 
what was to be a fifteen-year undeclared war against piracy, 
privateering, and the payment of tributes to the leaders of the 
Barbary States.18 
In his century-old writings on “The Attack and Defence [sic] of 
Trade,” the British naval historian Julian Corbett defined fertile and 
infertile areas for trade, arguing that “[t]he most fertile areas always 
attracted the strongest attack, and therefore required the strongest 
defence [sic].”19 In our time, cyberspace-enabled commerce has created 
an entirely new map of fertile areas for trade to occur. Foreign cyber 
pirates and privateers, backed by their state governments, are taking 
over the modern cyber equivalents of those merchant ships, their 
ports, and their transit routes. They conduct computer network 
exploitation with the support of their governments, routinely looting 
from American ships of commerce in cyberspace, while our military’s 
cyber warships are still under construction or, at best, protect only 
the military ports in which they remain moored. 
III. The Necessary Debate: Can and Should the 
Military Defend Commercial Cyberspace? 
Currently, the U.S. military is responsible for defending the .mil 
domain, which is its small portion of the global internet 
infrastructure.20 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is 
responsible with defending the .gov domain, which is the U.S. 
Government enclave within the larger internet sphere.21 Yet, no one is 
 
18. For a more detailed look at the conflict between the U.S. Navy and the 
Barbary pirates during the Jefferson Administration, see GREGORY 
FREMONT-BARNES, THE WARS OF THE BARBARY PIRATES: TO THE 
SHORES OF TRIPOLI: THE BIRTH OF THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINES 39-64 
(2006). 
19. Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, in 4 ROOTS OF 
STRATEGY 149, 250 (David Jablonski ed., 1999).  
20. William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s 
Cyberstrategy, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 97, 103; Joseph S. Nye 
Jr., Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security?, STRAT. STUD. Q., Winter 2011, 
at 18, 22.  
21. U.S. DEF. DEP’T, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING 
IN CYBERSPACE 8 (2011), http://www.defense.gov/ news/ 
d20110714cyber.pdf.  
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responsible for defending American interests, economic or otherwise, 
in the .com, .edu, .net, or any of the other public Internet Protocol 
domains. Both the government and the military, however, rely greatly 
on the larger public internet space outside the .gov and .mil domains. 
In its own reporting, the DoD admits to its dependence on 
cyberspace, which by definition includes the vast non-DoD-controlled 
portions of the Internet and commercial systems.22 
Furthermore, the private sector has a rather schizophrenic outlook 
on the topic. The private sector may well expect the DoD to defend 
its digital interests in cyberspace, just as the private sector expects 
the DoD to defend American physical and personal interests on the 
land, in the air, and on the sea. However, individuals and 
corporations are fearful of any over-regulation and invasion of privacy 
that they associate with an equivalent defensive effort in cyberspace.23 
The U.S. military, on the other hand, is beginning to realize that it 
may be called upon one day to defend a virtual territory for which it 
currently has no defensive capability. 
Setting aside capability for a moment, this current condition of 
responsibility (or lack thereof) is akin to building a military whose 
sole purpose is to defend the frontier fort in which it is garrisoned, or 
the ports in which its ships are berthed, but not beyond. In this 
analogy, the U.S. Army has never left the safety of its protected 
perimeters despite the fact that the enemy is ravaging the pioneer 
towns just outside its walls, nor has the U.S. Navy left its protected 
ports despite the extortion of commercial shipping by foreign pirates 
in American territorial waters and beyond. There will come a day 
when the U.S. Government, including the DoD, may be asked to 
defend infrastructure (e.g. dams, power grids, banking networks), 
industries, or even corporations themselves. In order to provide for 
that defense, the military would need to operate in public IP space, 
on networks upon which they currently do not. Neither the general 
public nor private industry is prepared to make the perceived 
concessions to civil liberties necessary to enable that type of defense. 
This is a difference of expectations worth studying.  
There are myriad questions we must debate when considering the 
role of the government and the private sector in securing cyberspace 
to enable the American economic engine. There are legal issues of 
 
22. Id. at 8 (“Along with the rest of the U.S. Government, the Department 
of Defense (DoD) depends on cyberspace to function. It is difficult to 
overstate this reliance; DoD operates over 15,000 networks and seven 
million computing devices across hundreds of installations in dozens of 
countries around the globe.”). 
23. Natasha Solce, The Battlefield of Cyberspace: The Inevitable New 
Military Branch—The Cyber Force, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 293, 316-
318 (2008) (describing the concerns with military regulation and 
oversight in cyberspace).  
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privacy and liability, practical issues of capability and capacity, and 
philosophical issues of roles and responsibilities. Protection from cyber 
economic espionage merits serious consideration beyond the simplistic 
division of the internet into separate “spaces” for the military, 
government, industry, and academia to develop and defend (or not 
defend) in their own ways. Sadly, these difficult issues have all 
received less attention than those of cybercrime and a potential 
“Armageddon-like cyber shutdown.” As a result, the National 
Academy of Sciences reports that there are currently “no legal 
mechanisms or institutional structures available to provide immediate 
relief” in the case of a computer network exploitation against an 
entity in the private sector.24 
IV. Recommendations 
In fairness, no element of the U.S. Government, including the 
military, has adequate organization or resources to meet the challenge 
of defending American economic interests in cyberspace. The prospect 
of severe cuts to the defense budget, and deep concern by the public 
over perceptions of intelligence overreach by the National Security 
Agency (NSA) in the wake of the Edward Snowden leaks, will not 
make the challenge easier.25 That does not, however, diminish the 
need for informed debate on the responsibilities of both the military 
and the intelligence community in this new domain. At some point, 
the cavalry must ride and the frigates must take to the high seas. The 
questions are when and how, and the time to debate them is now, not 
years from now when the advantage will lie even more squarely with 
cyber pirates and privateers backed by even more emboldened 
governments. 
First, U.S. Cyberspace Command (USCYBERCOM) must define 
specific roles for its National Cyber Protection Teams, which it is 
currently building. Second, USCYBERCOM must create trust 
relationships with key intellectual property companies, just as they 
currently have with cleared defense contracting companies. Third, 
DoD must increase its cooperation and information sharing with the 
DHS on all matters of cyber defense. Much of the private sector 
 
24. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL NAT’L ACADS., TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW AND 
ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK 
CAPABILITIES 203 (William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Lam & Herbert S. 
Lin eds., 2009), http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651. 
25. See Runa A. Sandvik, Illuminating The Billion Dollar U.S. Intelligence 
Budget: Project SpyLighter Documents NSA Surveillance Technology, 
FORBES (Nov. 26, 2013, 9:56 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/runasandvik/2013/11/26/illuminating-the-united-states-billion-
dollar-intelligence-budget-project-spylighter-documents-surveillance-
technology-used-by-the-nsa/.  
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naturally fears working with the NSA or the military, but the private 
sector may be more willing to work with DHS. Leveraging that 
relationship as a bridge between the military and the private sector 
may lead to innovative solutions in cooperative cyber defense from 
economic espionage. Fourth, both DoD and DHS need to explore the 
notion of deterrence in cyberspace, and they must make 
recommendations for coordinated government policy approaches. This 
is an area ripe for exploration, and it is a matter of policy more than 
technology. The technical challenges of attribution are difficult but 
not impossible. The possibilities of active defenses, retaliation, and 
penalties for continued cyberspace-enabled economic espionage must 
inform the strategic idea of a national will to create effective 
deterrence against such attacks. Finally, to enable the above 
recommendations, there must be an informed academic, and very 
public, debate about the role of the U.S. military in the defense of 
public cyberspace. Only then can we resolve the differences in 
expectations that exist today.  
V. Conclusion 
We must elevate the level of analysis and debate over the greatest 
long-term threat to American national security, which is the 
significant and ever-increasing state-sponsored economic espionage 
enabled by our global connectedness in cyberspace. This debate must 
include a discussion of responsibilities of the public and private 
sectors in securing the pillars of the American economy. From the 
earliest days of its inception, the U.S. military has played an 
important role in the defense of global trade and, as a result, the 
growth of the American economy. As a man-made domain, cyberspace 
has taken on many of the characteristics of the domains of the sea 
and land as they relate to trade and commerce. It is necessary to 
define the role of the government in response to state-sponsored, 
cyber-enabled economic espionage, as well as the role of the modern 
military in the protection of American interests in the cyberspace 
domain. 
Writing in the early 1900s about the opportunistic Barbary 
leaders who jumped on the new, ripe target of American commerce in 
the late 1790s and early 1800s, Lord Stanley Poole noted that “[a]s 
early as 1785 the Dey of Algiers found in American commerce a fresh 
field for his ploughing [sic]; and of all traders, none proved so welcome 
as that which boasted of its shipping, yet carried not an ounce of shot 
to defend it.”26 Today, America’s intellectual capital floats exposed in 
the undefended sea of cyberspace, and none of its ships of industry 
 
26. STANLEY LANE-POOLE, JAMES DOUGLASS, & JERROLD KELLY, THE STORY 
OF THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 274 (1890) available at Project Gutenberg.  
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carries an ounce of shot to defend it from what are increasingly 
identifiable foreign, state-sponsored threats. The defense of American 
intellectual property in cyberspace carries enormous legal, 
philosophical, and practical implications regarding the role of the 
government and military in that effort. We must debate these issues 
and arrive at a coherent strategy, however, before the wholesale theft 
of American intellectual property in cyberspace begins to look like the 
centuries-long insult of extortion payments paid to the Barbary 
states. 
 
